In this paper we advocate a new initial allocation mechanism for a tradable pollution permit market. We outline a Permit Allocation Contest (PAC) that distributes permits to …rms based on their rank relative to other …rms. This ranking is achieved by ordering …rms based on an observable 'external action'where the external action is an activity or characteristic of the …rm that is independent of their choice of emissions in the tradeable permit market. We show that this mechanism e¢ ciently allocates permits and, as a result, the tradeable permit market is cost-e¤ective. We determine the symmetric equilibrium strategy of each …rm in choosing their external action and …nd the choice is in ‡uenced by the …rm's cost structure and the regulator's choice of permit allocation schedule (distribution of permits to the market). Furthermore, we investigate the factors that determine the regulator's choice of optimal permit allocation schedules.
Introduction
The fundamental idea behind tradable permit markets allows a regulator to allocate pollution rights in a cost e¤ective manner. As a consequence of competitive trading, theory dictates that …rms' choice of abatement will be independent from the initial allocation of permits [22] . Indeed, the choice of allocation mechanism can be selected on equity criteria only. Yet, it is widely recognised that this independence rarely occurs in existing tradable permit markets due to the violation of various strong assumptions (see, for example, Hahn [11] and Stavins [32] ). Consequently, an active debate has been established investigating the optimal choice of initial allocation mechanism. In particular, an important strand in this discussion has centered around whether grandfathering (a free allocation of permits based on historical emissions/output) or auctioning permits is the preferred form of initial allocation mechanism [4, 8, 26, 27, 29] . However, this debate has rarely ever considered the use of alternative allocation mechanisms and it is our aim in this paper to broaden the discussion of allocation design by outlining and advocating an alternative allocation mechanism that may be preferred to existing approaches.
In this paper we outline an alternative initial allocation mechanism in a tradeable permit market. Our mechanism, a Permit Allocation Contest (PAC), distributes permits to …rms based on their rank relative to each other. The ranking is achieved by ordering …rms based on an observable 'external action'where the external action is an activity or characteristic of the …rm that is independent of their choice of emissions in the tradeable permit market. This ranking criterion is determined by the regulator who chooses this to meet a public policy objective. We show that this mechanism e¢ciently allocates permits and as a result the tradeable permit market is cost-e¤ective.
Moreover, we determine the symmetric equilibrium strategy of each …rm to choose their external action and investigate the regulator's optimal choice of permit distribution. 1 As previously mentioned, in the existing literature, allocation types are usually distinguished into two broad categories: the grandfathering and auctioning of permits.
The grandfathering of permits occurs when the regulator freely allocates allowances to each …rm based on their historical emissions (perhaps output or some other proxy).
Although a popular and frequently used mechanism, grandfathering is far from an ideal allocation mechanism as it is often viewed as politically cumbersome and ine¢ cient [4, 33] . Firms may have an incentive to lobby the regulator in favour of larger permit allocations which, due to the use of wasteful resources, may reduce social welfare in the economy. Moreover, when grandfathering is used with information that is updated over time-updated grandfathering-a link is created between a …rm's current level of emissions and it's future permit allocation which may result in a distortionary incentive to increase emissions [2, 19] . In this case, grandfathering no longer produces a cost-e¢ cient level of abatement on the part of …rms.
The main alternative to grandfathering is generally considered to be auctioning. In an auction, permits are allocated to each …rm based on their monetary bid relative to every other …rm [4, 6, 12, 17, 18, 25] . Auctions are often considered to be a 'lumpsum'allocation mechanism as permits are distributed to each …rm independent of their historical emissions. Due to this characteristic, auctioning is viewed as a desirable and e¢ cient method of allocating permits [4] . However, the main drawback, and as a result, the main reason for the infrequent use of auctions is the political di¢ culty in implementing such a mechanism. As the winners in the auction are obliged to pay for their permits, …rms' resistance against implementing auctions have been a severe restriction on the implementation of such schemes. 1 It is possible to reduce …rms' resistance to auctions by redistributing revenue to the participants (revenue neutral auction [12] ) or to reduce distortionary taxes in the economy (the revenue recycling e¤ect [26, 27] ), however, such schemes are very rarely implemented. With problems associated with both grandfathering and auctioning it is therefore desirable to try and …nd mechanisms that may be better suited for tradeable permit markets.
A frequently used allocation mechanism in areas such as labour markets and sporting competition analysis allows participants to be ranked in order of their e¤ort or actions [16, 34] . Within this general model, two main mechanisms exist: rank-order tournaments and rank-order contests. The distinction between the two rests on the relationship between agents' unobservable e¤ort and observable actions. Rank-order tournaments are incentive schemes used in situations where …rms' performance is observed with some exogenous noise. That is, in rank-order tournaments, it is generally assumed that each agent experiences a stochastic relationship between their e¤ort and actions. In most cases, when the observation noise is common to all …rms, rank-order tournaments typically outperform absolute, or individualistic, schemes [10, 13, 16, 23, 24] .
When there is no individual-speci…c noise involved in the observation of …rms'actions, one can implement a rank-order contest, which is, in e¤ect, a multi-prize all-pay auction [1, 3, 7, 20, 21] . This di¤ers from tournaments as agents in rank-order contest models are generally assumed to have a deterministic relationship between e¤ort and actions. In a rank-order contest, there is a …nite number of prizes to be distributed among the participating agents, with the size of each prize known before the onset of the contest. Firms compete in this contest by submitting costly (monetary or nonmonetary) "bids". Firms then are ranked in order of their bids, and the "prizes" are distributed to the …rms according to …rms'rankings. That is, a …rm that submits the highest bid is ranked …rst, and thus gets the largest permit allocation ("…rst prize"), the …rm that submits the second-highest bid is ranked second, and thus gets second-largest allocation ("second prize"), and so on, up to the …rm that submits the lowest bid being 3 ranked last, and thus receiving the smallest allocation (possibly nothing). Rank-order contests, like tournaments, tend to outperform alternative types of individualistic and contract based regulation.
The potential of rank-based mechanisms is clear when we consider the limited literature that focuses on environmental policy issues. By applying the seminal work of Lazear and Rosen [16] , Govindasamy et al. [9] advocated the use of a tournament to control non-point pollution, whereby each polluting …rm is ranked by its input use or pollution abatement e¤ort. Govindasamy et al. [9] found that a tournament can work well as it can achieve the same e¢ ciency conditions as a Pigouvian tax but with less costly information requirements. Shogren and Hurley [31] experimentally tested a tournament reward system to consider the implication for environmental policy (for example, they considered Coasian bargaining and environmental con ‡ict) and found that using such a reward system made the experiment participants behave in a similar manner to theoretical predictions (for example, the Coasian bargaining outcome was achieved). They showed that tournaments reached the theoretical outcomes quicker than other "standard" mechanisms which suggests tournaments systems can provide robust incentives to e¤ectively implement environmental regulation.
The above tournament studies have all assumed a probabilistic link between …rm e¤ort and observable action. However, it is also important to consider scenarios where …rms' e¤ort and observable action are deterministically linked. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no attempt at implementing a rank-order contest to environmental issues and, in particular, no attempt at implementing a rank-order contest as a mechanism for the initial allocation of pollution permits. This, then, is our main contribution to the literature. Our partial equilibrium model attempts to reach a middle ground between grandfathering and auctioning. As our model is a type of 'all-pay auction' it has many 4 similarities to a standard permit auction. Yet, as the ranking criterion in the PAC can be non-monetary, it is possible to have characteristics similar to a grandfathering mechanism. Our model has two stages. In the …rst stage, every …rm is ranked in order of the size of external action. Each …rm obtains a permit allocation which is directly related to their ranking in the PAC. In the second stage, …rms obtain the permit allocation and choose a level of emissions to minimise the cost of participating in the tradeable permit market.
The papers that are most relevant to our argument are Glazear and Hassin [7] and Moldovanu and Sela [20] . Glazer and Hassin [7] study the design of a contest to try and maximise the expected aggregate output of a set of …rms. They …nd that with identical …rms, the prizes should be equal (apart from the lowest prize which should be zero). Moreover, when …rms have di¤erent abilities, it is optimal to choose only one prize. In a similar vein, Moldovanu and Sela [20] study a rank-order contest with several risk neutral agents and a contest designer aiming to maximise the total expected e¤ort. Moldovanu and Sela [20] separate their model into three distinct cases: when the costs of choosing e¤ort are linear, concave or convex. They …nd it is optimal to allocate a single prize when contestants costs are linear or concave and to allocate multiple (possibly equal or unequal) prizes when costs are convex (again, apart from the lowest prize which should be zero). Our model uses a similar contest structure to the above studies by allowing a number of permit allocations to be allocated to several …rms in a tradeable permit market. We study an allocation system in which there are no random errors present to alter …rms' external action choices: in other words, the regulator can observe the external actions of each …rm with no error (a perfectly discriminating contest).
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 introduces the concept of a PAC and explains the rationale for its use. Section 3 discusses the general properties of the 5 model. Section 4 discuses the tradeable permit market. Section 5 details the PAC mechanism discuses the …rm's problems and analyses the regulators optimal choice of permit allocations and Section 6 concludes.
2 An Alternative Approach to the Initial Allocation of Permits This paper concentrates on a rank-order contest: a mechanism where agents are rankordered with respect to their (costly) bids [7, 10, 13, 16, 20, 21, 23, 24] . In our model, we use a rank-order contest to allocate permits in a tradeable permit market, which we denote as a Permit Allocation Contest (PAC). To keep the ranking criterion as general as possible, we assume that …rms will be ranked on their choice of an observable 'external action'. The observable 'external action' is an activity or characteristic of the …rm which is independent from its choice of emissions and the permit market. It can be, at the extreme, an invariant characteristic of a …rm. However, a more interesting case involves …rms being able to decide upon their 'external actions', thus having the ability to alter their permit allocations. For example, possible 'external actions'include the improvement in noise reduction in …rms'facilities, the record of health and safety incidents or some corporate and social responsibility criterion and so on. The regulator aims to select an appropriate criterion to rank all …rms so that the action is independent of emission choices and where the aggregate action can ful…l an objective set by the regulator. We return to this issue in the next section.
A Permit Allocation Contest is a special type of auction in which every participating …rm, regardless of the …nal outcome, incurs the cost of choosing a 'bid'or 'action'(an all-pay auction). It follows that a PAC has a number of properties similar to a standard permit auction (and some unique to itself).
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In a PAC, the decisions regarding the number and size of permit allocations has a substantially di¤erent e¤ect on the incentives of each …rm compared to alternative mechanisms, such as a 'winner-pays'auction. The permit allocations in the PAC are not directly related to the …rms'external actions, but instead they are determined by …rms'rankings according to the size of their external actions. Thus, a small increase in the …rm's external actions may result in a disproportionately large change in permit allocation. For example, a small increase in external action by the second-ranked …rm could make this …rm the winner of the contest, and thus lead to the largest permit allocation (which is typically made to be substantially larger than the "second prize"). 2 Rank-order contests, and in particular our PAC, involve a clear rule of allocation of prizes (i.e. no regulator's subjective judgement is involved), and are easily adaptable to changing market and technological conditions. Moreover, as Krishna and Morgan [14] showed, all-pay auctions tend to generate higher aggregate bids than their winner-pay counterparts. In addition, as Moldovanu and Sela [20] showed, when the prize structure is suitably chosen, such a contest will tend to generate the largest aggregate bids. As the choice of external action at the margin can signi…cantly alter a …rm's permit allocation, the robust incentives created in the PAC system should induce all …rms to maximise their external action.
As the ranking criterion need not be monetary in value, there may be a wide variety of possible external actions to choose from (any action that is independent of emissions choices is admissible). It follows that one may be chosen so that the scheme is politically acceptable for the regulator, market participants and the wider economy. Consequently, a PAC system has the possibility of being implemented in a wide variety of tradeable permit market contexts. For instance, a PAC could be implemented in an international permit market where the participating countries are allocated permits (or a burden is assigned to each country) based on their (country) external action, such as the proportion of recycling in that the country and so on. Yet, this system could also be adapted to smaller markets, such as …rms choosing external actions based on their improvement in noise pollution. Every tradeable permit market has heterogeneous circumstances in which it operates and with a PAC, public policy objectives (and external actions) can be chosen to compliment the social 'norms'and prevailing political opinion in the speci…c emissions trading scheme. In contrast, although auctioning and grandfathering can be used in all tradeable permit markets, the only allocation criterion available is the comparison of …rms' money 'bids' and historical emissions, respectively. The lack of other possible allocation criterion may make, especially for the case of auctions, implementation more di¢ cult.
Using a PAC in a tradeable permit market may o¤er the (political) bene…t of having a clear connection between permit allocations (including the di¤erences between them) and some socially bene…cial …rm action. It is possible that a PAC system may actually appear 'fairer'to a larger number of groups in society than alternative mechanisms as it couples permit allocation (a reward to the …rms) with some public policy objective.
In contrast, grandfathering permits creates a perverse link between emissions and the permit rent each …rm receives. 3 Therefore, large polluters are implicitly rewarded and small polluters are implicitly punished for their choice of emissions.
Similar to the auctioning of permits, a PAC takes an 'instrumentalist'perspective in that it ignores past and current permit holdings when determining permit allocations [28] . Therefore, this type of allocation approach treats all …rms equally in that …rms who invest early in pollution abatement are not implicitly punished (as would happen under a grandfathering scheme). However, unlike an auction, a PAC mechanism can be adapted so non-monetary criterion are used to rank the …rms which may be more appealing to participating …rms than an auction.
Although a PAC distribution mechanism appears to have a number of possible advantages over alternative mechanism a limitation of the PAC is that the external action must be de…ned in an appropriate manner. As noted above, an optimal external action has to be independent of emissions so that no distortions are created in the permit market whilst simultaneously being politically acceptable for all market participants and observable to the regulator. Unsurprisingly, the existence of an optimal external action may not necessarily occur. The ease with which an external action can be chosen crucially depends on the speci…c institutional context of the permit market.
For instance, when the market participants are countries, such as in an international permit market, it may be relatively easy to …nd an external action that is both socially bene…cial and independent of emissions. Countries in a carbon dioxide permit market, such as the EU-ETS, could be ranked on the proportional reduction of land…ll waste from the non-trading sector (or the production of methane from it). As the market participants, become smaller in size (e.g. industries or …rms), it may be more di¢ cult to …nd an external action with the desirable qualities. Throughout this paper, for analytical simplicity, we discuss …rms as the participating agents, however, the idea can be adapted to a wider institutional context.
General Properties of Model
Let = f1; 2; : : : ; ng be a set of …rms that participate in a competitive tradeable permit market to control a pollutant. In this tradeable permit market, …rm i chooses a level of emissions e i at a cost c i (e i ) with dc i (e i ) de i a secondary (unrelated) objective. To allow for analysis, we restrict our attention to public policy scenarios in which the regulator aims to minimise a social 'bad'produced by all …rms in the permit market, such as the improvement of: health and safety incidents, noise pollution, other pollutants, corporate responsibility and so on. Therefore, in our model, the regulator simply wants to minimise the aggregate social 'bad' (or maximise some social 'bene…t') by using incentives in the form of permit allocations (without the need for standard command and control regulation). To adhere to the regulator's public policy objective, …rm i chooses an external 'action'denoted by z i , in
In other words, the external action is an activity taken by each …rm, independent of emissions choices, to comply with the regulator's goal of minimising some aggregate social 'bad'. 4 The model is separated into two distinct stages. In the …rst stage, the regulator initially allocates the pollution permits to the market and in the second stage, …rms are allowed to trade the pollution permits obtained in the …rst stage.
In stage one, the regulator chooses an ordered schedule (vector) of permit allocations, s = (s 1 ; s 2 ; : : : ; s n ) 2 R n + subject to s 1 s 2 : : : s n 0 and P n j=1 s j = E where s j is the j th permit allocation and E is the absolute aggregate emissions cap for the tradeable permit market (the regulator's precise choice of permit allocations will be considered later in this paper). 5 Using the permit allocation schedule, the regulator distributes a (possibly unequal) permit allocation to each …rm whilst ensuring the absolute emissions cap is binding. The speci…c permit allocation to a …rm depends on each …rm's size of external action relative to every other …rm, so that …rms that have a larger relative size of external action obtain a larger permit allocation. 6 In a PAC, the regulator observes the external actions of all …rms and ranks them in descending order of their external action where the …rm with the highest level of external action is ranked …rst, the second highest …rm is ranked second and so on until all …rms are ranked. 7 Each ranked-ordered …rm obtains a corresponding permit allocation so that the …rm with the top ranking obtains the largest permit allocation (s 1 ), the second ranked obtains the second highest permit allocation (s 2 ) and so on until all individual permit allocations are distributed to the …rms.
In stage two of the model, given a known permit allocation, each …rm decides to choose a level of emissions to minimise the net cost of participation in the tradeable permit market.
As mentioned above, the regulator has two non-competing policy objectives. 8 Firstly, the regulator is motivated to choose a schedule of permit allocations to minimise the aggregate abatement cost in the tradeable permit market-the standard permit market regulatory objective. Second, the additional objective of the regulator is to provide incentives for the permit market …rms to achieve some predetermined public policy target linked to the external actions of …rms which we de…ne as the maximisation of expected aggregate external actions. As such, the regulator is not a strict social cost minimiser since it is not concerned with the …rms'costs of obtaining an external action (it simply wants to maximise the aggregate action). Following this approach shows the realistic separation and independence between two legislative procedures which may commonly occur between a product and tradeable permit market. The regulator is not focusing on choosing an e¢ cient level of aggregate external action for the second public policy objective, instead, the regulator wants to simple maximise aggregate actions. We solve the model backwards by investigating the permit market in the following section and then focusing on the initial allocation of permits in the subsequent section.
Stage Two: The Permit Market
In this section, we investigate …rm i's optimal choice of emissions in a permit market when the tradeable permits have been allocated using a PAC.
From stage one, let us assume that …rm i chose a positive level of external action (z i ) and, as a result of the …rm's ranking, the regulator distributed a permit allocatioñ s i 2 s to the …rm wheres i is independent of e i . With the endowment of tradeable permit obtained, …rm i aims to minimise (maximise) the cost (pro…t) of participating in the permit market. Formally, given a market equilibrium permit price p, …rm i's objective function is:
Solving for …rm i's emissions gives us:
From equation (2), each …rm will choose a level of emissions to equate their marginal abatement cost with the permit price and it follows from standard theory that:
Proposition 1 When a PAC distributes permits, the tradeable permit market is leastcost.
A PAC is an e¢ cient instrument to allocate permits as it is a 'lump-sum'mechanisma mechanism by which permits are distributed independently of the choice variable (emissions). The criterion for allocating the permits (the external action) is independent of emission choices, therefore, no distortions exist in the tradeable permit market.
Due to the 'lump-sum'characteristics of a PAC, e¢ ciency in the tradeable permit market is independent from the schedule of permit allocations chosen by the regulator [22] .
In contrast, Böhringer and Lange [2] and MacKenzie et al. [19] have shown that the e¢ cient distribution of abatement reached in equation (2), does not necessarily hold when permits are allocated using updated grandfathering-the use of updated historical information for the allocation of free permits.
Stage One: The Initial Allocation of Permits (PAC)
In the last section, it was noted that when …rms obtain tradeable permits through a PAC-a mechanism that ranks …rms in order of their level of external action-the permit market can be least-cost. In this section, we investigate the PAC in more detail and, in particular, given an exogenously …xed permit allocation schedule, …nd the conditions that a¤ect each …rm's choice of external action. We then investigate the optimal choice of permit allocation schedule that can maximise the aggregate external action (public policy objective).
The Permit Allocation Contest in this paper, follows closely to the work of Barut and Kovenock [1] , Glazer and Hassin [7] and Moldovanu and Sela [20, 21] . For analytical simplicity, we assume throughout that every …rm participates in the PAC. Therefore, we are implicitly assuming the cost involved in participating in the PAC is less than the cost of abatement and/or purchasing permits from the market. 9 We begin by discussing 9 The results would still be maintained if we assumed that some …rms did not participate in the PAC. The vector of permit allocations would be distributed to the …rms that did participate in the PAC and the remaining …rms would purchase permits, reduce emissions or a mixture of both. 13 the …rm's problem.
Firm' s Problem
Using the contest approach of Moldovanu and Sela [20] , we represent the ability of each …rm to produce an external action by the parameter i where the costs of producing the external action are i v(z i ), with v(0) = 0. 10 Firm i's own ability parameter i is privately observed before the PAC commences. We further assume that the ability parameter is separable from the external action and is independently drawn from a support [a; b] ; 0 < a < b < 1 with the (commonly known) distribution function G( i )
Although each …rm knows its own ability parameter and the distribution of ability parameters for its competitors, no …rm knows the actual realization of its rivals'ability parameters. Similarly, although the permit allocation schedule is common knowledge, each …rm's actual permit allocation is uncertain at the time of the decision-making.
In other words, by participating in PAC, all …rms engage in a game of incomplete information. Given its knowledge of own ability, of the distribution of abilities, and of schedule of permit allocations, each …rm uses its expectations of permit allocation to choose an optimal level of external action.
We employ the techniques used for perfectly discriminating contests (e.g. Moldovanu and Sela [20] ), and suppose that each …rm i adopts a symmetric strictly monotonic di¤erentiable strategy z i = h( i ) which is strictly decreasing in its ability parameter i .
Notice that strict monotonicity of strategies implies that 1 G( i ) is the probability that …rm i's external action z i is greater than the external action of another …rm k with an ability parameter k randomly drawn from the common distribution G( ), i.e. that z i = h( i ) > z k = h( k ). Thus, one can write the expected permit allocation of a …rm i as:
The expected permit allocation in equation (3) is a linear combination of n order statistics where the probability of obtaining the j th permit allocation is based on the probability of being ranked j th in the PAC [5, 7, 21] . For example, the probability of winning the largest permit allocation is the probability of being ranked …rst ((1 G( i )) n 1 ), alternatively, it is the probability of n 1 …rms being ranked below this …rm. Equation (3) is strictly decreasing in i as a larger i implies a 'lower'ability and choice of external action and thus a lower expected permit allocation.
We now proceed to derive the symmetric equilibrium strategy h( ). Given the expected allocation of permits (3) and the market equilibrium permit price p, …rm i chooses the optimal level of its external action z i = h( i ) by maximizing its expected net payo¤ from permit allocation:
where h 1 ( ) is the inverse function of h( ). We have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Given its objective function (4), …rm i's optimal level of external action is:
Proof. Given the common strategy z i = h( i ) which is strictly decreasing, monotonic and di¤erentiable function, suppose …rm i chooses a level of external action~ i so that z i = h(~ i ). Substituting this common strategy into equation (4) gives
Di¤erentiating with respect toz i , we arrive at the …rst-order condition:
In equilibrium, …rm i will choosez i = z i so that
Multiplying by dz i dh 1 and rearranging, we get
Again, using the common strategy
Notice that, in a symmetric equilibrium, the …rm with the worst possible ability i = b
will get the lowest-ranked permit allocation s n with certainty, and thus will choose an external action of zero. This gives us the upper boundary condition of h(b) = 0.
Integrating (6) with respect to i , and utilizing the boundary condition h(b) = 0, we
and as required
Proposition (2) implies that …rms' optimal external actions are determined by a 16 number of factors. First, the shape (or curvature) of the cost function v( ) is an important determinant of the level of external action chosen by each …rm. Indeed, the 'less' convex a …rm's cost function, the higher the optimal external action. Second, since dz i dp > 0, a higher market equilibrium permit price p would lead to each …rm choosing a higher external action. Third, a general increase in the regulator's schedule of permit allocations s would increase the value of the marginal permit allocation B 0 ( ), thus increasing the optimal external action. Furthermore, an increase in the number of …rms, as well as certain changes in the distribution of abilities G( ) may also lead to higher optimal external actions. Despite all of the above factors tending to lead to more aggressive "bidding" for permit allocations -and, thus, to higher aggregate external actions, -only one of the factors is in the regulator's control -namely the schedule of permit allocations. We now look into how the regulator can maximize the aggregate external actions by choosing an appropriate permit allocation schedule.
Regulator' s Problem
In the previous subsection, we looked at the decision problems of the …rms participating in the permit allocation contest (PAC). Using the incomplete information game approach to PAC, we derived the symmetric strictly decreasing di¤erentiable equilibrium strategies for each participating …rm. In this subsection, we focus on the second policy objective of the regulator, namely, the regulator's motivation to maximise some public policy objective.
Up to this point, we have assumed that the schedule of permit allocations has been exogenously …xed and known to all …rms. In this sub-section, we relax this assumption and allow the regulator to choose a schedule from the set of feasible permit allocations n (s 1 ; s 2 ; : : : ; s n ) 2 R n + : s 1 s 2 : : : s n 0;
Suppose that the regulator has committed to some public policy objective, which 17 involves the maximization of the aggregate choice of the external action z i by all participating …rms, and that the regulator chose a PAC as a suitable mechanism to achieve his objective. Given the symmetric equilibrium strategy of each …rm (5) , one can write the regulator's objective as:
subject to: 
where h( i ) is the symmetric strategy for the external action given by equation (5) . Therefore, T is the expected value of aggregate external actions given that each …rm obtains an ability from the support [a; b] and each …rm follows the symmetric equilibrium strategy. Note that the regulator's problem (7)-(8) in its general formulation cannot be solved analytically. However, a number of key implications can be discussed.
One popular permit allocation schedule discussed in tradeable permit market literature involves an egalitarian distribution of permits across all …rms or countries [28] .
For example, allocating an equal number of permits per capita has been strongly advocated as a distributional rule for an international permit market [15, 30] . While some form of egalitarian allocation may have a number of merits, it may not be desirable to achieve the second policy objective. To see this, consider an extreme egalitarian allocation where …rms obtain identical number of permits independent of all …rms'actions or characteristics -a 'pure'lump-sum approach. In such a scenario, the regulator's schedule of permit allocations is s egal = ( E n ; E n ; : : : ; E n ), where each …rm in the PAC obtains an identical share of the permit cap. If the regulator were to use such a schedule of permit allocations, then from equations (5) and (7), it is immediate that:
Corollary 3 If the regulator chooses an egalitarian permit allocation schedule ('pure' lump-sum approach) s egal = ( E n ; E n ; : : : ; E n ) then no second public policy objective is achievable.
Proof. Given an egalitarian distribution s egal = ( E n ; E n ; : : : ; E n ), we have that B(G( i )) = E n and consequently we have B 0 ( )G 0 ( i ) = 0. In other words, the distribution of permits is independent of …rm's external actions, and there is no uncertainty about …rm's permit allocation. Hence from equation (5) it follows that
In other words, an egalitarian approach provides no incentives for …rms to take an external action, and thus is not suitable if the regulator wants to combine the permit allocation of a tradeable permit market with a public policy objective. For a regulator to succeed in a public policy objective, it must instead choose a schedule of permit allocations that discriminates in favour of …rms with larger external actions and against the ones with smaller actions. 11 As Barut and Kovenock [1] and Glazer and Hassin [7] showed, to maximise the aggregate external action, the lowest-ranked permit allocation s n must involve zero permits. Otherwise, there would be an incentive for …rms with 'weaker'abilities (i.e. with high i 's) to reduce their level of external action and obtain a positive level of permit allocation. In other words, if there are n …rms, a schedule of permit allocations must involve at least one zero permit allocation s n = 0 and no more than n 1 non-zero permit allocations.
We now turn to the discussion of the permit allocation schedule that the regulator may want to implement in order to maximize the aggregate external action.
Discussion of the Permit Allocation Schedule
In general, optimal contest mechanisms are notoriously di¢ cult to characterize analytically. To analyze the permit allocation schedule that maximizes the aggregate value of the external action, one needs to take the expectation of z i as given in equation (7).
The resulting expression does not have an analytic solution, and thus, even the simplest analysis of the optimal allocation schedule is a formidable task. Some general insights to the problem were provided by Moldovanu and Sela [20, 21] and references therein, advocating for some discriminatory features of contests. In particular, Moldovanu and Sela [20] showed that when costs functions are linear or concave, it is optimal to allocated the prize "pie"to only a single "…rst"prize. They also showed when cost functions are convex, several positive prizes may be optimal.
To our knowledge, Moldovanu and Sela [20] is the only work that provides an adequate analysis of the contest with convex costs, and thus is tremendously important for our purposes. However, their work does not go beyond the situation when there are only two potentially non-zero prizes, and provides only a limited analysis for an arbitrary number of contestants n. In other words, to date, there is no analytical solution of the optimal allocation schedule involving more than two potentially non-zero allocations, and, thus, a calculation of an optimal allocation schedule by necessity has to be numerical. However, even in the situation of more than three …rms it is, however, not clear how to tackle the situation even numerically. 12 Here, we will try to extend the intuition behind the analysis of Moldovanu and Sela [20] to the case of more than two potentially non-zero allocations with convex costs, and employ it for numerical 12 We also would like to caution against doing an ad-hoc numerical analysis for an arbitrary sample of …rms' cost parameters. The results of such analysis will depend on the actual sample of cost parameters, and thus may lead to misleading results. Furthermore, if one assumes that the sample of the cost parameters is known to the participants, the contest game would change from an incomplete information game to a complete information game. For work on contests in a complete information setup, see Barut and Kovenock [1] . 20 estimations.
Suppose that the regulator chose the schedule (vector) of permit allocations with s 1 s 2 s j 1 s j s n 0, such that s 1 +s 2 + +s j 1 +s j + +s n = E.
If all …rms follow a symmetric strictly monotonic equilibrium strategy, then, according to Proposition (2), …rm i will choose the following level of external action given by equation (5) . Let us write z i = v 1 (y( i )), where y( i ) is the argument of the inverse cost function v( ) as given in equation (5) . In other words, let
Since v( ) is a strictly increasing function, an increase in y( i ) would result in an increase in z i . Thus, if for a particular i , a certain change in the allocation schedule results in an increase in y( i ), that would also imply an increase in …rm i's choice of external action z i .
To understand how …rm i's equilibrium choice of z i depends on the allocation schedule, let us …rst derive B 0 ( ), which is the marginal return to …rm i's expected permit allocation B(G( i )) from an increase in …rm's rank G( i ). Using equation (3), after some manipulations, one arrives at the following expression:
In other words, the marginal return to …rm i's expected permit allocation B(G( i )) from an increase in …rm's rank G( i ) depends on the combination of incremental changes in permits a …rm i could obtain by moving from the (j 1)th-ranked allocation s j 1 to one-rank higher allocation s j , for all j allocations.
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Combining the above expression (10) with the expression (9) for y( i ), we get
As equation (11) indicates, only the "allocation distance"between neighbouring-ranked permit allocations s j 1 s j is important for …rms'incentives. That is, what is important is how much more permits a j-th ranked …rm could have obtained from moving one rank up to rank j 1, rather than the absolute levels of permit allocations s j and s j 1 . One can now immediately observe that Corollary 3 holds, as if all allocations are the same, i.e. s 1 = s 2 = = s j 1 = s j = = s n (in other words, all "allocation distances"are zero), each …rm would choose zero external action (since v(0) = 0).
Note that, by construction, the "top" allocation s 1 is non-zero, while all permit allocations are weakly ranked, i.e. for any rank 2 j n 1, we have that s j 1 s j s j+1 . Thus, one of the important questions to be addressed is whether an optimal allocation schedule involves consequently ranked allocations which are equal to each other. As it turns out, this is a di¢ cult task. To see this, let us look at what happens to y( i ) when an allocation s j increases. Inspecting the expression (11) , observe that, for 2 j n 1, any unit increase in an allocation s j has two e¤ects. First, as s j increases, this decreases the "upward distance" s j 1 s j , and thus has a negative "upward distance" e¤ect. Second, as s j increases, the "downward distance" s j s j+1 increases, so that the "downward distance" e¤ect is positive. Thus, we can write the expression (11) as:
Here, the …rst term in the sum is the negative "upward distance" e¤ect, and the second term is the positive "downward distance" e¤ect. Thus, one can write the total marginal e¤ect of a change in s 1 (which consists only of the positive "downward distance"e¤ect) as @y( i ) @s 1 = p(n 1)
and the total marginal e¤ect of a change in s n (which consists only of the negative "upward distance"e¤ect) as @y( i ) @s n = p(n 1)
Finally, the total marginal e¤ect of a change in s j ; 2 j n 1 as @y( i ) @s j = p(n 1)
The problem could have been very easy to solve if at least one of the following three strong conditions hold.
1. If the total response of each …rm i 2 [a; b] to an increase in some s j is non-23 positive (i.e. @y( i ) @s j 0), this would be su¢ cient to require that a given allocation s j has to be equal to its lower bound -which is the one-rank lower allocation s j+1 or zero.
2. Even if the marginal change @y( i ) @s j is strictly positive for all i (as it is the case for s 1 ), this is not a su¢ cient condition for an allocation s j to be distinct from the one-rank below allocation s j+1 . This is because, it is possible that the marginal e¤ect of one-rank lower allocation s j+1 could potentially be even larger for all …rms, in which case it would be optimal to increase s j+1 . However, as the upper bound for s j+1 is the one-rank higher allocation s j , it could be optimal for the allocation s j to be set equal to its lower bound s j+1 . That is, s j = s j+1 . To rule out this situation, one needs, in addition, to verify that the marginal e¤ect is bigger for s j than for one-rank lower allocation s j+1 . Thus, a strong su¢ cient condition for s j > s j+1 to be optimal, requires that @y( i ) @s j > 0 and, in addition,
3. Finally, if the total marginal e¤ect of an increase in s j is smaller than the marginal e¤ect of one-rank lower allocation s j+1 for all i , this is su¢ cient to require that s j to be equal to its lower bound, which is the one-rank below allocation s j+1 , or zero. That is, for s j = s j+1 to be optimal, it is su¢ cient that @y( i )
Clearly, one of these strong su¢ cient conditions always holds for the bottom-ranked allocation s n . That is, as @y( i ) @sn < 0 for each …rm i 2 [a; b], this is su¢ cient to require that the bottom-ranked allocation s n is equal to zero. However, we could not …nd a single instance of either of these three strong conditions to take place for the higherranked allocations. Given the di¢ culties of the analytical approach, we now turn to our estimation with speci…c cost parameters. 24 
Estimations for Uniformly Distributed Cost Parameters
We will now turn to the estimation of an optimal allocation schedule using the example of uniformly distributed cost parameters i on [a; b]; 0 a < b < 1, so that G( i ) = i a b a . Here, the expression (12) becomes: 13
To get some understanding of the incentives that arise from each allocation s j , we will now turn to more speci…c examples.
A Case of Three Firms
The case of three …rms is, perhaps, the least complicated, and even yields to limited analytical exploration. For n = 3, the expression (16) becomes:
Note that, by the mean value theorem, there exists some ! i 2 [ i ; b] such that 13 In dealing with this expression, the following formula was useful:
it depends on the cost parameter i ). Thus, it is easy to verify that the marginal e¤ect of the top-ranked allocation s 1 is strictly positive:
Since a < i < ! i < b, the e¤ect of the top-ranked allocation is positive for all i 2 [a; b].
As we will see, this, however, is not su¢ cient for a distinct top allocation s 1 . Observe that the e¤ect of the second-ranked allocation s 2 is
Thus, for …rms with ! i > a+b 2 , the e¤ect of second-ranked allocation @y( i ) @s 2 is positive. A conservative estimate suggests that the distinct second-ranked allocation s 2 would have a total positive e¤ect at least on …rms with i a+b 2 , or those in the upper half of the cost distribution (because ! i > i a+b 2 ). Furthermore, we also need to check the di¤erence between the two marginal e¤ects: But because of the convexity of the cost function v( ) (see expression (5)), a …rm i's external action z i tends to exhibit diminishing returns, so that the marginal impact of relatively high-cost …rms on the aggregate external action T tends to be substantial.
Indeed, as Moldovanu and Sela [20] were able to show in a similar setup that an optimal allocation schedule involves two distinct non-zero allocations, so that s 1 > s 2 > s 3 = 0.
A Case of Four Firms
It turns out that for the higher number of …rms, the situation is even more complicated.
Rather than approaching the problem analytically, we turn now to numerical estimation.
For n = 4, the expression (16) becomes:
It is easy to con…rm that neither of the three strong su¢ cient conditions hold here, so that we need to turn to numerical estimations (we used Mathematica). We consider a simple case of a uniform distribution on 1 2 ; 1 . Recall that, as usual, the bottom allocation s n is set equal to zero. As Figure 1a shows, the marginal e¤ect of the top allocation s 1 is the highest for the lowest-cost …rms. On the other hand, the marginal e¤ect of the second-ranked allocation s 2 peaks out for the mid-range costs, and the e¤ect for the third-ranked allocation s 3 peaks out for the relatively higher-cost …rms, and, moreover, the heights of the peaks are similar. This, together with the convexity of costs, suggests a possibility that it might be optimal to set the third-ranked allocation Indeed, let us …rst check what happens if we set the third-ranked allocation s 3 equal to zero. Setting s 3 = 0 allows us to express the middle allocation as s 2 = E s 1 , with
In this case, as Figure 1b suggests, the expected aggregate external action (given by expression (7)) has a maximum around s 1 E 2 . In other words, here it is not optimal to allocate the entire "pie" of permit allocations only to a single top-ranked …rm, i.e. we need that s 1 < E. Furthermore, if we now set the top-ranked allocation equal to a half of the pie (so that s 3 = E 2 s 2 ), the Figure 1c con…rms that it would be optimal to set the third-ranked allocation to be equal to the second-ranked allocation, i.e. s 2 = s 3 . Thus, the optimal allocation schedule for four …rms and costs distributed uniformly on 1 2 ; 1 , will be approximately equal to s 1 E 2 ; s 2 s 3 E 4 ; s 4 = 0. Performing similar manipulations for costs distributed uniformly on [1; 5] , we …nd that the optimal allocation schedule for four …rms will be approximately equal to s 1 Similarly, we found that for other uniform distributions, the pattern is similar, i.e. the highest expected aggregate external action T happens when there is a relatively large top allocation, followed by two equal allocations, with the bottom allocation being zero.
For example, for i U 1 3 ; 1 , we have that s 1 While our numerical …ndings may not be robust with respect to the shape of the distribution and the number of …rms, we are however able to show, similarly to Moldovanu and Sela [20] , that the optimal allocation schedule in the presence of convex costs need not be very discriminatory, possibly exhibiting equal consecutively-ranked allocations.
However, our work also suggests a possibility that the optimal allocation schedules will tend to involve the top allocation s 1 to be larger than the lower-ranked allocations.
Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to outline a new type of permit initial allocation mechanism. In our model, the initial allocation of tradeable pollution permits is done via a Permit Allocation Contest (PAC). A PAC is a rank-order contest in which the …rms are allocated permits according to the ordinal rank of the size of their external action (which is an activity or characteristic of the participating …rms that is independent of emissions choices).
In our model, the regulator was assumed to have two policy objectives. First, by allocating permits based on the external action (rather than based on emissions), the regulator aims to minimise the aggregate cost of reducing emissions. Second, by choosing a suitable permit allocation schedule (i.e. the number of permits that …rms can obtain by being ranked …rst, second, and so on), the regulator aims to ful…l a predetermined public policy objective, requiring maximisation of the aggregate actions, which are independent of emissions (i.e. "external" to the permit market) -e.g. improvements in health and safety policies, corporate and social responsibility, etc.
Since, by construction, the permit allocation schedule is independent of emissions, the allocation mechanism results in cost-e¤ective permit market, in contrast to the outcome under updated grandfathering. We consider a symmetric strictly monotonic strategy equilibrium of a incomplete information game of PAC, where the permit allocation schedule as well as the cost distribution are publicly known, but where each …rm's cost parameter of external actions is the …rm's private information.
To obtain the public policy objective, the regulator must choose an optimal permit allocation schedule. We …nd that an egalitarian allocation schedule (whereby …rms obtain identical permit allocations regardless of their external action) cannot achieve the public policy objective as an egalitarian allocation schedule leads to zero aggregate external actions. Instead, for a public policy objective to be achieved, the schedule must be discriminatory -at least for the lower-ranked permit allocations. Our analytical and numerical analysis is in accordance with earlier theoretical results. It shows that for the maximum aggregate external actions to be obtained, the lowest-ranked permit allocation has to be zero, and, when costs of external actions are convex, the higherranked permit allocations have to be less discriminatory. Although the regulator's optimal permit allocation schedule is di¢ cult to solve analytically, a PAC is still an implementable mechanism. This paper provides guidance for policymakers on how to implement a PAC and select an optimal permit allocation schedule for a public policy objective. In particular, we have shown that the regulator's optimal permit allocation schedule will depend extensively on the structure and distribution of …rms'costs and must be taken into consideration when implementing a PAC.
The PAC, at its simplest, has attempted to reach the middle ground between grandfathering and auctioning. On one hand, PAC creates similar incentives to an auction and could, in theory, e¢ ciently allocate permits. On the other hand, it has features of grandfathering as it does not require politically unpopular monetary bids. While PAC does require other forms of expenditure, a suitably designed PAC may require expenditure on socially-bene…cial activities which …rms are already pursuing even in the absence of PAC, or which …rms may …nd to attractive to pursue. Thus, a suitable designed PAC may be both politically feasible and e¢ cient. In addition, PAC is a ‡exible mechanism as it allows ranking of …rms using a wide variety of external actions, and thus could be adapted to a variety of industrial and regional circumstances.
One possible practical di¢ culty of implementation of PAC lies in the identi…cation 31 and implementation of a suitable external action. This is because in order for the PAC to achieve e¢ ciency, the external action must be independent of emissions, and in addition it has to be politically agreeable to …rms, the regulator and society. Given the current political climate, it might be di¢ cult to identify an external action that satis…es all these requirements. However, we hope that further political process and public awareness will help to overcome these identi…cation and implementation problems.
